TLP:CLEAR
CISA M365 Secure Configuration Baseline for Exchange Online
Microsoft 365 (M365) Exchange Online is a cloud-based messaging platform that gives users easy access to their email and supports organizational meetings, contacts, and calendars. This Secure Configuration Baseline (SCB) provides specific policies to strengthen Exchange Online security.
Many admin controls for Exchange Online are found in the Exchange admin center. However, several essential security functions for Exchange Online require a dedicated security tool, e.g., for data loss prevention. M365 provides these security functions natively via Defender for Office 365. Notably, Defender for Office 365 capabilities require Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 or 2. These are included with E5 and G5 and are available as add-ons for E3 and G3. However, third-party solutions that offer comparable security functions can be used in lieu of Defender. Refer to the CISA M365 Secure Configuration Security Suite Baseline for additional guidance.
The Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project, run by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides guidance and capabilities to secure federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agencies’ cloud business application environments and protect federal information that is created, accessed, shared, and stored in those environments.
The CISA SCuBA SCBs for M365 help secure federal information assets stored within M365 cloud business application environments through consistent, effective, and manageable security configurations. CISA created baselines tailored to the federal government’s threats and risk tolerance with the knowledge that every organization has different threat models and risk tolerance. While use of these baselines will be mandatory for civilian Federal Government agencies, organizations outside of the Federal Government may also find these baselines to be useful references to help reduce risks.
For non-Federal users, the information in this document is being provided “as is” for INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial entities or commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoritism by CISA. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, some controls and settings are not available in all products; CISA has no control over vendor changes to products offerings or features. Accordingly, these SCuBA SCBs for M365 may not be applicable to the products available to you. This document does not address, ensure compliance with, or supersede any law, regulation, or other authority. Entities are responsible for complying with any recordkeeping, privacy, and other laws that may apply to the use of technology. This document is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit for anyone against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
This document is marked TLP:CLEAR. Recipients may share this information without restriction. Information is subject to standard copyright rules. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see https://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
License Compliance and Copyright
Portions of this document are adapted from documents in Microsoft’s M365 and Azure GitHub repositories. The respective documents are subject to copyright and are adapted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. Sources are linked throughout this document. The United States government has adapted selections of these documents to develop innovative and scalable configuration standards to strengthen the security of widely used cloud-based software services.
Assumptions
The License Requirements sections of this document assume the organization is using an M365 E3 or G3 license level at a minimum. Therefore, only licenses not included in E3/G3 are listed.
Key Terminology
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
BOD 25-01 Requirement: This indicator means that the policy is required under CISA BOD 25-01.
Automated Check: This indicator means that the policy can be automatically checked via ScubaGear. See the Quick Start Guide for help getting started.
Configurable: This indicator means that the policy can be customized via config file.
Manual: This indicator means that the policy requires manual verification of configuration settings.
Baseline Policies
1. Automatic Forwarding to External Domains
This control is intended to prevent bad actors from using client-side forwarding rules to exfiltrate data to external recipients.
Policies
MS.EXO.1.1v2
Automatic forwarding to external domains SHALL be disabled.
- Rationale: Adversaries can use automatic forwarding to gain persistent access to a victim’s email. Disabling forwarding to external domains prevents this technique when the adversary is external to the organization but does not impede legitimate internal forwarding.
- Last modified: March 2025
- Note: Automatic forwarding MAY be enabled with specific, agency-approved domains. There may be cases where an external domain is operationally needed and has an acceptable degree of risk, e.g., a domain controlled by the same agency that hasn’t been added as an accepted domain in M365.
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: AC-4
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
Resources
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.1.1v2 Instructions
To disallow automatic forwarding to external domains:
-
Sign in to the Exchange admin center.
-
Select Mail flow, then Remote domains.
-
Select Default.
-
Under Email reply types, select Edit reply types.
-
Clear the checkbox next to Allow automatic forwarding, then click Save.
-
Return to Remote domains and review each additional remote domain in the list, ensuring that automatic forwarding is only allowed for approved domains.
2. Sender Policy Framework
The Sender Policy Framework (SPF) is a mechanism allowing domain administrators to specify which IP addresses are explicitly approved to send email on behalf of the domain, facilitating detection of spoofed emails. SPF is not configured through the Exchange admin center, but rather via Domain Name System (DNS) records hosted by the agency’s domain. Thus, the exact steps needed to set up SPF vary from agency to agency, but Microsoft’s documentation provides some helpful starting points.
Policies
MS.EXO.2.2v3
An SPF policy SHALL be published for each domain that fails all non-approved senders.
- Rationale: An adversary may modify the
FROMfield of an email such that it appears to be a legitimate email sent by an agency, facilitating phishing attacks. Publishing an SPF policy for each agency domain mitigates forgedFROMfields by providing a means for recipients to detect emails spoofed in this way. SPF is required for FCEB departments and agencies by Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 18-01, “Enhance Email and Web Security”. - Last modified: October 2025
- Note: SPF defines two different “fail” mechanisms: fail (indicated by
-, sometimes referred to as hardfail) and softfail (indicated by~). Either hard or soft fail may be used to comply with this baseline policy. - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: AC-2d
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
Resources
-
Binding Operational Directive 18-01 - Enhance Email and Web Security | DHS
-
How Microsoft 365 uses Sender Policy Framework (SPF) to prevent spoofing | Microsoft Learn
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.2.2v3 Instructions
First, identify any approved senders specific to your agency, e.g., any on-premises mail servers. SPF allows you to indicate approved senders by IP address or CIDR range. However, note that SPF allows you to include the IP addresses indicated by a separate SPF policy, referred to by domain name. See External DNS records required for SPF for inclusions required for M365 to send email on behalf of your domain.
SPF is not configured through the Exchange admin center, but rather via DNS records hosted by the agency’s domain. Thus, the exact steps needed to set up SPF varies from agency to agency. See Add or edit an SPF TXT record to help prevent email spam (Outlook, Exchange Online) | Microsoft Learn for more details.
To test your SPF configuration, consider using a web-based tool, such as
those listed under How can I validate SPF records for my domain? | Microsoft Learn.
Additionally, SPF records can be requested using the
PowerShell tool Resolve-DnsName. For example:
Resolve-DnsName example.onmicrosoft.com txt
If SPF is configured, you will see a response resembling v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
returned; though by necessity, the contents of the SPF
policy may vary by agency. In this example, the SPF policy indicates
the IP addresses listed by the policy for “spf.protection.outlook.com” are
the only approved senders for “example.onmicrosoft.com.” These IPs can be determined
via an additional SPF lookup, this time for “spf.protection.outlook.com.” Ensure the IP addresses listed as approved senders for your domains are correct. Additionally, ensure that each policy either ends in -all or ~all or redirects to one that does; these directives indicates that all IPs that don’t match the policy should fail. See SPF TXT record syntax for Microsoft 365 | Microsoft Learn for a more in-depth discussion
of SPF record syntax.
3. DomainKeys Identified Mail
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) allows digital signatures to be added to email messages in the message header, providing a layer of both authenticity and integrity to emails. As with SPF, DKIM relies on DNS records; thus, its deployment depends on how an agency manages its DNS. Exchange Online Protection (EOP) features include DKIM signing capabilities.
Policies
MS.EXO.3.1v1
DKIM SHOULD be enabled for all domains.
- Rationale: An adversary may modify the
FROMfield of an email such that it appears to be a legitimate email sent by an agency, facilitating phishing attacks. Enabling DKIM is another means for recipients to detect spoofed emails and verify the integrity of email content. - Last modified: June 2023
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: SC-8
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
Resources
-
Binding Operational Directive 18-01 - Enhance Email and Web Security | DHS
-
Use DKIM to validate outbound email sent from your custom domain | Microsoft Learn
-
Support for validation of DKIM signed messages | Microsoft Learn
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.3.1v1 Instructions
- To enable DKIM, follow the instructions listed on Steps to Create, enable and disable DKIM from Microsoft 365 Defender portal | Microsoft Learn.
4. Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) works with SPF and DKIM to authenticate mail senders and helps ensure destination email systems can validate messages sent from your domain. DMARC helps receiving mail systems determine what to do with messages sent from your domain that fail SPF and DKIM checks.
Policies
MS.EXO.4.1v1
A DMARC policy SHALL be published for every second-level domain.
- Rationale: Without a DMARC policy available for each domain, recipients may improperly handle SPF and DKIM failures, possibly enabling spoofed emails to reach end users’ mailboxes. Publishing DMARC records at the second-level domain protects the second-level domains and all subdomains.
- Last modified: June 2023
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: SI-8
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
MS.EXO.4.2v1
The DMARC message rejection option SHALL be p=reject.
- Rationale: Of the three policy options (i.e., none, quarantine, and reject), reject provides the strongest protection. Reject is the level of protection required by BOD 18-01 for FCEB departments and agencies.
- Last modified: June 2023
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: SI-8
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
MS.EXO.4.3v1
The DMARC point of contact for aggregate reports SHALL include reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov.
- Rationale: Email spoofing attempts are not inherently visible to domain owners. DMARC provides a mechanism to receive reports of spoofing attempts. Including reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov as a point of contact for these reports gives CISA insight into spoofing attempts and is required by BOD 18-01 for FCEB departments and agencies.
- Last modified: June 2023
- Note: Only federal, executive branch, departments and agencies should include this email address in their DMARC record.
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: SI-4(5)
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
MS.EXO.4.4v1
An agency point of contact SHOULD be included for aggregate and failure reports.
- Rationale: Email spoofing attempts are not inherently visible to domain owners. DMARC provides a mechanism to receive reports of spoofing attempts. Including an agency point of contact gives the agency insight into attempts to spoof their domains.
- Last modified: June 2023
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: SI-4(5)
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
Resources
-
Binding Operational Directive 18-01 - Enhance Email and Web Security | DHS
-
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) | RFC 7489
-
Best practices for implementing DMARC in Office 365 | Microsoft Learn
-
How Office 365 handles outbound email that fails DMARC | Microsoft Learn
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.4.1v1 Instructions
DMARC is not configured through the Exchange admin center, but rather via DNS records hosted by the agency’s domain. As such, implementation varies depending on how an agency manages its DNS records. See Form the DMARC TXT record for your domain | Microsoft Learn for Microsoft guidance.
A DMARC record published at the second-level domain will protect all subdomains.
In other words, a DMARC record published for example.com will protect both
a.example.com and b.example.com, but a separate record would need to be
published for c.example.gov.
To test your DMARC configuration, consider using one of many publicly available
web-based tools. Additionally, DMARC records can be requested using the
PowerShell tool Resolve-DnsName. For example:
Resolve-DnsName _dmarc.example.com txt
If DMARC is configured, a response resembling v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov, mailto:reports@example.com; ruf=mailto:reports@example.com
will be returned, though by necessity, the contents of the record will vary
by agency. In this example, the policy indicates all emails failing the
SPF/DKIM checks are to be rejected and aggregate reports sent to
reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov and reports@example.com. Failure reports will be
sent to reports@example.com.
MS.EXO.4.2v1 Instructions
See MS.EXO.4.1v1 Instructions for an overview of how to publish and check a DMARC record. Ensure the record published includes p=reject.
MS.EXO.4.3v1 Instructions
See MS.EXO.4.1v1 Instructions for an overview of how to publish and check a DMARC record. Ensure the record published includes reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov as one of the emails for the RUA field.
MS.EXO.4.4v1 Instructions
See MS.EXO.4.1v1 Instructions for an overview of how to publish and check a DMARC record. Ensure the record published includes:
- A point of contact specific to your agency in the RUA field.
- reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov as one of the emails in the RUA field.
- One or more agency-defined points of contact in the RUF field.
5. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol Authentication
Modern email clients that connect to Exchange Online mailboxes—including Outlook, Outlook on the web, iOS Mail, and Outlook for iOS and Android—do not use Simple Mail Transfer Protocol Authentication (SMTP AUTH) to send email messages. SMTP AUTH is only needed for applications outside of Outlook that send email messages. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) cannot be enforced while using SMTP Auth. Proceed with caution if SMTP Auth needs to be enabled for any use case.
Policies
MS.EXO.5.1v1
SMTP AUTH SHALL be disabled.
- Rationale: SMTP AUTH is not used or needed by modern email clients. Therefore, disabling it as the global default conforms to the principle of least functionality.
- Last modified: June 2023
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: CM-7
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
- None
Resources
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.5.1v1 Instructions
To disable SMTP AUTH for the organization:
-
Sign in to the Exchange admin center.
-
On the left hand pane, select Settings; then from the settings list, select Mail Flow.
-
Make sure the setting Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization is checked.
6. Calendar and Contact Sharing
Exchange Online allows creation of sharing polices that soften default restrictions on contact and calendar details sharing. These policies should be enabled with caution and only after considering the following policies.
Policies
MS.EXO.6.1v1
Contact folders SHALL NOT be shared with all domains.
- Rationale: Contact folders may contain information that should not be shared by default with all domains. Disabling sharing with all domains closes an avenue for data exfiltration while still allowing for specific legitimate use as needed.
- Last modified: June 2023
- Note: Contact folders MAY be shared with specific domains.
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: AC-3, SC-7(10)(a)
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
MS.EXO.6.2v1
Calendar details SHALL NOT be shared with all domains.
- Rationale: Calendar details may contain information that should not be shared by default with all domains. Disabling sharing with all domains closes an avenue for data exfiltration while still allowing for legitimate use as needed.
- Last modified: June 2023
- Note: Calendar details MAY be shared with specific domains.
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: AC-3, SC-7(10)(a)
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
Resources
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.6.1v1 Instructions
To restrict sharing with all domains:
-
Sign in to the Exchange admin center.
-
On the left-hand pane under Organization, select Sharing.
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Select Individual Sharing.
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For all existing policies, select the policy, then select Manage domains.
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For all sharing rules under all existing policies, ensure Sharing with all domains is not selected.
MS.EXO.6.2v1 Instructions
To restrict sharing calendar details with all domains:
- Refer to step 5 in MS.EXO.6.1v1 Instructions to implement this policy.
7. External Sender Warnings
Mail flow rules allow incoming email modification, such that email from external users can be easily identified (e.g., by prepending the subject line with “[External]”).
Policies
MS.EXO.7.1v1
External sender warnings SHALL be implemented.
- Rationale: Alerting users when email originates from outside their organization can encourage them to exercise increased caution, especially if an email is one they expected from an internal sender.
- Last modified: June 2023
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: SI-8
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
Resources
-
Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online | Microsoft Learn
-
Capacity Enhancement Guide: Counter-Phishing Recommendations for Federal Agencies | CISA
-
Actions To Counter Email-Based Attacks On Election-Related Entities | CISA
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.7.1v1 Instructions
To create a mail flow rule to produce external sender warnings:
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Sign in to the Exchange admin center.
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Under Mail flow, select Rules.
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Click the plus (+) button to create a new rule.
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Select Modify messages….
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Give the rule an appropriate name.
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Under Apply this rule if…, select The sender is external/internal.
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Under select sender location, select Outside the organization, then click OK.
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Under Do the following…, select Prepend the subject of the message with….
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Under specify subject prefix, enter a message such as “[External]” (without the quotation marks), then click OK.
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Click Next.
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Under Choose a mode for this rule, select Enforce.
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Leave the Severity as Not Specified.
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Leave the Match sender address in message as Header and click Next.
-
Click Finish and then Done.
-
The new rule will be disabled. Re-select the new rule to show its settings and slide the Enable or disable rule slider to the right until it shows as Enabled.
13. Mailbox Auditing
Mailbox auditing helps users investigate compromised accounts or discover illicit access to Exchange Online. As a feature of Exchange Online, mailbox auditing is enabled by default for all organizations. Microsoft defines a default audit policy that logs certain actions performed by administrators, delegates, and owners. While mailbox auditing is enabled by default, this policy helps avoid inadvertent disabling.
Policies
MS.EXO.13.1v1
Mailbox auditing SHALL be enabled.
- Rationale: Exchange Online user accounts can be compromised or misused. Enabling mailbox auditing provides a valuable source of information to detect and respond to mailbox misuse.
- Last modified: June 2023
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 FedRAMP High Baseline Mapping: AU-12c
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
Resources
License Requirements
- N/A
Implementation
MS.EXO.13.1v1 Instructions
Mailbox auditing can be managed from the Exchange Online PowerShell. Follow the instructions listed on Manage mailbox auditing in Office 365.
To check the current mailbox auditing status for your organization via PowerShell:
-
Connect to the Exchange Online PowerShell.
-
Run the following command:
Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-List AuditDisabled -
An
AuditDisabled : Falseresult indicates mailbox auditing is enabled.
To enable mailbox auditing by default for your organization via PowerShell:
-
Connect to the Exchange Online PowerShell.
-
Run the following command:
Set-OrganizationConfig –AuditDisabled $false
TLP:CLEAR